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NOTE
LIMITS OF THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT'S ABILITY TO
PROTECT AGAINST WI-FI SNIFFING
Mani Potnuru*
Adoption of Wi-Fi wireless technology continues to see explosive growth.
However many users still operate their home Wi-Fi networks in unsecured
mode or use publicly available unsecured Wi-Fi networks, thus exposing
their communications to the dangers of "packet sniffing," a technique used
for eavesdropping on a network. Some have argued that communications
over unsecured Wi-Fi networks are "readily accessible to the general pub-
lic" and that such communications are therefore excluded from the broad
protections of the Federal Wiretap Act against intentional interception of
electronic communications.
This Note examines the Federal Wiretap Act and argues that the current
Act's treatment of Wi-Fi sniffing might protect unsecured Wi-Fi communi-
cations under some circumstances, but that any such protections are
incidental, unsystematic, and uncertain. This Note further argues that the
current statute's "readily accessible to the general public" language
should be interpreted in a way that addresses concerns about Wi-Fi sniff-
ing and users' expectations of privacy. Users' current expectations stem
from their limited understanding of the underlying Wi-Fi technology and
the accompanying security risks and, more importantly, from the fact that
private communications cannot be intercepted without specialized tools
and knowledge not readily available to the general public. Finally, this
Note advocates for amending the Federal Wiretap Act to remove uncertain-
ty regarding protections against Wi-Fi sniffing. Clear protections against
Wi-Fi sniffing would avoid the private and social cost of data theft result-
ing from sniffing and could close the gap between users'theoretical ability
to protect themselves by using security mechanisms and their reduced
practical ability to take any such protective measures.
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INTRODUCTION
When Google Street View' first became publicly available, people were
fascinated by the ability to zoom into a particular location and see real pic-
tures of homes or businesses from the comfort of their homes. To offer these
features, Google deployed a fleet of cars equipped with a global positioning
system ("GPS"), high-resolution 360-degree cameras, and radio scanners to
roam neighborhoods and photograph the publicly visible environs. Most
were unaware that, while scouring neighborhoods, Google's cars were also
scanning the airwaves for active Wi-Fi2 networks. 3
In May 2010, Google admitted that since initiating its Street View pro-
gram in 2007, it had collected upwards of 600 gigabytes of payload4
data-including private information like emails, voice communications,
passwords, and financial and medical records-from "open" (i.e., unsecured)
1. Google Street View, a technology featured in the Google Maps application, pro-
vides panoramic views of places from various street positions around the world. See Street
View for Google Maps, GOOGLE MAPs, http://maps.google.com/help/maps/streetview/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2012).
2. "Wi-Fi" is a shorthand term for "Wireless Fidelity" and is the current industry
standard for most wireless data networks. See infra Part I.
3. Google's cars mapped the available Wi-Fi networks in cities across the country to
help mobile devices determine their location. See Location Source and Accuracy, GOOGLE,
http://support.google.com/gmm/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=81873 (last visited Feb. 20,
2012). Google is certainly not the only company using cars equipped with radio scanners to
create a Wi-Fi network database; companies such as Skyhook use similar techniques.
See Coverage Area, SKYHOOK, http://www.skyhookwireless.comlocation-technology/
coverage.php (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
4. Data packets transmitted over a Wi-Fi network include both "payload," which con-
tains a user's private information, and information that identifies the source and destination of
the payload. See Payload, TECHTERMS.COM, http://www.techterms.com/definition/payload (last
visited Feb. 12, 2012). This Note focuses on protecting users' privacy interest in payload data,
instead of addressing information contained in data packets. See infra note 110.
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wireless networks.5 This admission raised serious concerns about privacy
and potential Federal Wiretap Act6 violations. Google used "packet sniff-
ing," a technology used to eavesdrop on a network by intercepting and
decoding network communications7 and to collect users' private data
transmitted over unsecured networks. 8 Google claimed that any use of
technology capturing payload data from unsecured wireless networks was
accidental, 9 and it firmly denied using any of the private data it had cap-
tured. 10
The Google incident demonstrates the rising privacy risks to users'
private Wi-Fi communications posed by "sniffing." As open Wi-Fi network
usage becomes even more popular, the threat to consumers' private data
continues to rise.1' There has been an explosive growth in the adoption of
wireless data networking technology, allowing users to connect to the
internet wirelessly in private homes, offices, and public places. To meet the
increased demand for wireless connectivity, more wireless access points,
known as "hotspots," are becoming readily available in public places like
airports, restaurants, and parks-and even on buses, trains, airplanes, and
freeway rest stops. 2 Intentionally or unintentionally, many individuals and
5. Alan Eustace, WiFi Data Collection: An Update, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (June 9,
2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/wifi-data-collection-update.html.
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
7. Prabhaker Mateti, Hacking Techniques in Wireless Networks, in ThE HANDBOOK OF
INFORMATION SECURITY 85-87 (Hossein Bidgoli ed., 2005), available at http://www.cs.wright
.edu/-pmateti/IntemetSecurity/Lectures/WirelessHacks/Mateti-WirelessHacks.doc.
8. See Eustace, supra note 5.
9. There are two kinds of scanning techniques that can be used to discover Wi-Fi Ac-
cess Points. In the "passive" scanning technique, the radio antenna listens for any and all
wireless signals and records any data transmitted, including payload data. But most passive
scanners are set specifically not to record payload data. To avoid any possibility of collecting
payload data, other wireless mapping companies, such as Skyhook, use "active" scanning-
for example, Skyhook's scanning equipment sends out a probe signal to determine whether
any Wi-Fi access points are in range. Access points recognize that signal and return their own
message with basic network identification information that basically says "Here I am, here is
how to find me." This is also how a typical computer or phone finds an available Wi-Fi net-
work. Google has admitted to using the "passive" scanning technique instead of the "active"
scanning method. According to Google, it inadvertently failed to configure the wireless scan-
ning software to discard payload data. See Tom Krazit, Deciphering Google 's Wi-Fi Headache
(FAQ), CNET NEWS (June 1, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684_3-20006342-
265.html.
10. Eustace, supra note 5.
11. See Press Release, Make Security a Priority in 2011: Protect Your Personal Data on
Wi-Fi® Networks, Wi-Fi ALLIANCE (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.wi-fi.org/news-articles.php?f
=medianews&newsid=1039 ("With an estimated 201 million households using Wi-Fi net-
works[] and as many as 750,000 Wi-Fi hotspots available worldwide, more personal data is
being carried by these networks, making Wi-Fi security paramount in importance.").
12. See AmtrakConnect Wi-Fi®, AMTRAK, http://www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer/
AMContentC/1246044325520/1237405732514 (last visited Feb. 18, 2012); Danny King,
WiFi in the Sky: Airlines Bring More Internet Access on Board, DAILYFINANCE (Aug. 28,
2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/wifi-airplanes-airlines-intemet/19611600;
Greyhound's New Low-Cost Buses, with Wi-Fi, BUDGET TRAVEL (Mar. 4, 2008, 11:22 AM),
October 20121
Michigan Law Review
businesses operate their Wi-Fi networks as unsecured, open networks. 3 This
allows hackers and other malicious actors to use packet-sniffing technology-
the same technology Google used to build its Street View program-to access
personal passwords, financial records, and other sensitive information, thereby
facilitating crimes like identity theft. In addition to the violation of users'
privacy, the social and economic costs of identity theft resulting from Wi-Fi
sniffing are significant. For example, a recent study found that on average an
identity theft victim loses approximately $5,000.'4  Moreover, the
Congressional Research Service has found that identity theft "is the fastest
growing type of fraud,"' 5 while the Federal Trade Commission estimates
that identity theft costs consumers approximately $50 billion annually. 16
Google's extensive collection of users' private data is one of the more
high-profile incidents of Wi-Fi sniffing. In response, several consumers
across the country filed class action lawsuits, alleging that Google had vio-
lated the Federal Wiretap Act, the principal law protecting electronic
communications from unauthorized interception.' 7 Google has responded to
these actions by arguing that unsecured Wi-Fi communications are excluded
from the Act's broad protections against intentional interception because
communications over unsecured networks are "readily accessible to the
general public" and therefore fall within an exception to the Act's protec-
tions. 8
This Note contends that at least some Wi-Fi communications may be
protected by the Federal Wiretap Act so that intercepting those communica-
tions would violate the Act. Part I briefly introduces Wi-Fi technology, the
types and functions of various Wi-Fi deployments, and the security issues
involved in the varying network setups. Part II then argues that the Act's
current treatment of Wi-Fi sniffing may protect unsecured Wi-Fi communi-
http://blog.budgettravel.com/budgettravel/2008/03/greyhoundsnewlowcost-buses-w.html;
Aaron Reed, Wi-Fi on the Highway: Rest Stops Go High-Tech, ROADTRIP AMERICA (Jan. 18,
2008), http://www.roadtripamerica.com/dashboarding/Wi-Fi-On-The-Highway.htm.
13. See, e.g., John E. Dunn, A Quarter of WiFi Networks Unsecured, Finds Survey,
TECHWORLD (Oct. 14, 2010, 1:03 PM), http://news.techworld.com/security/3244175/a-
quarter-of-wifi-networks-unsecured-finds-survey.
14. Jolie O'Dell, How Much Does Identity Theft Cost?, MASHABLE (Jan. 29, 2011),
http://mashable.com/2011/01/29/identity-theft-infographic.
15. KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40599, IDENTITY THEFT: TRENDS
AND ISSUES 1 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40599.pdf.
16. Id.
17. See In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc'ns Litig., 733 F Supp. 2d 1381
(J.P.M.L. 2010) (consolidating eight class action lawsuits in the Northern District of Califor-
nia); Complaint, Myhre v. Google, Inc., No. IOCVO 1444 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 9, 2010).
18. In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc'ns Litig., 794 E Supp. 2d 1067, 1073 (N.D.
Cal. 2011); see also Letter from Pablo Chavez, Dir. of Pub. Policy, Google Inc., to Henry A.
Waxman et al., Chairman, House Energy & Commerce Comm. 1, 5 (June 9, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter Google's Response], available at http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/
file/News/060910_Google-Response.pdf (claiming that Google "believe[s] [that] it does not
violate U.S. law to collect payload data from networks that are configured to be openly acces-
sible (i.e., not secured by encryption and thus accessible by any user's device)").
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cations under some circumstances, but that any such protections are inci-
dental, unsystematic, and uncertain. Next, Part III argues that the current
statute's "readily accessible to the general public" language, which allows
the interception of electronic communications on systems configured in a
way that makes those communications readily available to the general
public, should be interpreted in a manner that addresses concerns about
Wi-Fi sniffing and users' expectations of privacy. Part III also contends
that these expectations stem from users' limited understanding of the un-
derlying Wi-Fi technology and the accompanying security risks, and, more
importantly, from the fact that private unsecured Wi-Fi communications
cannot be intercepted without specialized tools and knowledge not readily
available to the general public. Finally, Part IV advocates amending the
Federal Wiretap Act to make Wi-Fi sniffing clearly prohibited under the
statutory language. Clear and uniform protections against Wi-Fi sniffing can
address the private and social costs of data theft resulting from Wi-Fi sniff-
ing and provide reasonable safeguards for Wi-Fi users.
I. THE Wi-Fi TECHNOLOGY LANDSCAPE
Wi-Fi has come to mean any kind of wireless network that operates us-
ing the common standards, collectively referred to as 802.11 protocols, set
by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE"). 19 The
basic network setup involves a Wireless Access Point ("WAP"), often re-
ferred to as a "wireless router," which is typically connected to the user's
Internet Service Provider's ("ISP") network through a wired connection and
communicates over radio frequencies with any device that is equipped with
a Wi-Fi adapter, such as a laptop or a smartphone. One can think of the
WAP as a small, short-range cell phone tower, and the Wi-Fi adapters in the
users' devices as radio receivers.
Though the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") regulates
most radio communications in the United States, Wi-Fi networks operate in
the unregulated frequency ranges known as Industrial, Scientific and Medial
("ISM") radio bands." This part of the radio spectrum can be used by any-
one, even persons without a license from the FCC. Devices such as
microwaves, cordless phones, wireless garage door openers, wireless micro-
phones, vehicle trackers, and amateur radios all operate in one of the ISM
bands.21 Wi-Fi networks use different frequency ranges of the ISM bands
19. IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY, WIRELESS LAN MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL (MAC) AND
PHYSICAL LAYER (PHY) SPECIFICATIONS (2007) [hereinafter IEEE], available at http://
standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-2007.pdf.
20. John Herrman, Giz Explains: Why Everything Wireless is 2.4GHz, GIZMODO (Sept.
7, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5629814/giz-explains-why-everything-wireless-is-
24ghz.
21. Id. The 2.4 GHz band was initially used for devices such as microwave ovens that
emit radio frequencies, but not for radio communications. In 1985, the FCC opened up the
ISM bands for wireless and mobile communications. See Definition of. ISM Band,
October 20121
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depending on the particular protocol being used.2" Each of the above ranges
is further divided into channels, just as radio and TV broadcast bands are
subdivided into channels, and each Wi-Fi network is configured to operate
on one of these channels.23
Despite revolutionizing how people connect to the internet, Wi-Fi tech-
nology raises a host of security concerns. Wi-Fi equipment allows users to
protect their network using a password, which enables users to restrict ac-
cess to their network. Once Wi-Fi networks are password protected, any
information transmitted over them is encrypted, making interception of
transmitted private data highly difficult, if not impossible.24 Notwithstanding
the available security mechanisms, many Wi-Fi networks are not secured for
various reasons. 5 First, the factory default settings for the Wi-Fi equipment
typically are set to operate the network in open mode. 26 For example, many
wireless modems provided by Comcast and other ISPs are set to operate in
this unsecured mode by default.27 Unless the Wi-Fi network owner affirma-
tively enables the security mechanisms, these Wi-Fi networks continue to
operate in open mode. This status quo creates a bias towards unsecured net-
works and tends to impede users' ability to change default rules. 28 Consumers
PCMAG.COM ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia-term/0,2542,t=unlicensed
+band&i=45467,00.asp (last visited June 22, 2011).
22. The 802.11 b and 802.11 g protocols operate in the 2400-2495 MHz frequency
range, but the 802.1 la protocol operates in the 5150-5825 MHz range. See WLAN Protocols,
BLUE EAGLE TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.blue-eagle-technologies.com/protocols.html (last
visited March 29, 2012).
23. For example, the 2.4000-2.495 GHz band of 802.1 lb/g protocols is divided into
eleven legally allowed channels with channel 1 centered on 2.412 GHz and channel 11 on
2.462 GHz. See 802.11b WiFi Frequency Channels, MOONBLINK, http://www.
moonblinkwifi.com/2point4freq.cfm (last visited June 22, 2011). Though the channels over-
lap, adjacent networks using different channels can operate without interference if the
particular networks are operating on different nonoverlapping channels, such as channels 1, 6,
and 11. Id.
24. A network administrator could also configure the wireless routers to not broadcast
the service set identifier ("SSID") for improved security and thus let in only users who already
know the network name, thereby preventing access to the network by unauthorized users. See
Wi-Fi (802.11) Security, GETNETWISE, http://security.getnetwise.org/tips/wifi (last visited
June 22, 2011). For improved security, the wireless router could also be configured to allow
access to the network to only certain computer Media Access Control ("MAC") addresses. Id.
But simply not broadcasting the SSID or limiting access to a certain set of MAC addresses,
without turning on encryption protocols such as Wi-Fi Protected Access ("WPA"), does not
prevent interception of data by more sophisticated interceptors. See id.
25. See Matt Hines, Worried About Wi-Fi Security?, CNET NEWS (Jan. 19, 2005, 4:00
AM), http://news.cnet.com/Worried-about-Wi-Fi-security/2100-7347_3-5540969.html (pre-
dicting that some 80 percent of U.S. residential wireless local area networks, or WLANs,
would be "unsecured" by 2007); see also infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
27. See Comcast-Supported Routers, Gateways, and Adapters, COMCAST
CUSTOMER CENTRAL, http://customer.comcast.com/help-and-support/intemet/comcast-
supported-routers-gateways-adapters/ (last visited March 29, 2012).
28. See generally Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation:
The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1583 (1998)
[Vol. 111:89
Limits of the Federal Wiretap Act
also might not enable the security features due to technological intimidation
or because of the cumbersome process.29 Moreover, they might lack aware-
ness of the risks involved in operating an unsecured network.30 Or they
simply might not be concerned about the threats unsecured networks pose,3'
perhaps because they choose to share internet access with others and thus
leave the network open. Current technology does not easily provide a secure
shared Wi-Fi network to a large section of the general public. This limitation
forces public libraries, cafes, airports, and other hotspots to operate net-
works in unsecured mode. 32
II. THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT
The Federal Wiretap Act's treatment of unsecured Wi-Fi communica-
tions is unsystematic and might only protect some private Wi-Fi
communications. The Act might afford some protection to unsecured
Wi-Fi communications under certain Wi-Fi network configurations, but
any such protection is purely incidental, because the statutory language is
not specifically aimed at these types of communications. Further, the Act's
ill-defined "readily accessible to the general public" exception leaves the
protection of unsecured private Wi-Fi communication uncertain.
The Wiretap Act prohibits intentionally3 3 intercepting or disclosing wire,
oral, or electronic communications.3 4 Initially, as enacted in Title Ill of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the Wiretap Act
protected only wire and oral communications from unauthorized
interception. 5 Congress amended the Wiretap Act in 1986 to prohibit the
interception of "electronic" as well as oral and wire communications. The Act
(discussing the ramifications of the status quo bias in contract negotiation and the motivational
basis for the preference of inaction); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo
Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (asserting the existence of a
substantial status quo bias in many important real decisions).
29. See infra Section III.A.
30. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
31. Matthew Bierlein, Note, Policing the Wireless World: Access Liability in the Open
Wi-Fi Era, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1123, 1131 (2006).
32. See also infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. For example, T-Mobile, which
operates one of the biggest nationwide networks of hotspots, acknowledges this limitation:
"WEP is based on 'shared secret' encryption. Shared secret encryption means that the 'secret'
(the key to the encryption) must be shared with all other WLAN users. Consequently, we
believe that this type of security solution is neither practical nor meaningful when used on a
public network." T-Mobile HotSpot Security Statement, T-MOBILE HOTSPOT,
https://selfcare.hotspot.t-mobile.com/security.htm (last visited June 22, 2011).
33. The Wiretap Act only prohibits intentional interception of electronic communica-
tions. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(a) (2006). Investigation of the "intentionality" requirement of the
Act is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note assumes that Google acted intentional-
ly and focuses on whether data transmitted over unsecured wireless networks even qualify for
the Wiretap Act's protections against interception. Google claims that it does not, an argument
that has implications far beyond Google's present litigation.
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
35. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968).
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specifically protects radio communications. 36 In addition to authorizing and
regulating electronic surveillance for law enforcement purposes, the Act
regulates private conduct. The amended, post-1986 Wiretap Act imposes
civil liability and criminal penalties3 7 on anyone who "intentionally
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication."38 The
Act defines "electronic communication" to include "any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or Foreign
commerce."3 9 Since data is transmitted over a Wi-Fi network using radio
signals, private data-including emails, passwords, financial or medical
records, as well as other web traffic-qualifies as electronic communication
within the meaning of the Act.
The Wiretap Act provides a set of exceptions to its broad prohibitions on
the interception of electronic communications.4" Google relies on the "readi-
ly accessible to the general public" exception, arguing that unsecured Wi-Fi
communications fall under this exception and that, as a result, its Street
View program did not violate the Act.4' The "readily accessible to the gen-
eral public" exception provides that it is not unlawful for any person "to
intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic
communication system that is configured so that such electronic communi-
cation is readily accessible to the general public."42 The terms "readily
accessible to the general public" and "configured" are the two key terms to
understanding the reach of this exception. This Part analyzes these two
prongs of the exception and argues that not all unsecured Wi-Fi communica-
tions are excluded from the Act's protections.
36. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§ 101(a)(6)(C), 100 Stat. 1848, 1849.
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520-22 (authorizing any person to recover damages and to seek an
injunction against illegal interception); id. § 2511 (4)(a) ("[W]hoever violates subsection (1) of
this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
40. Most of these exceptions do not apply to intentional sniffing of Wi-Fi networks.
One of these exceptions is the permission for an electronic communications provider's agent
to intercept communication "in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any
activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service." 18 U.S.C.
§ 251 1(2)(a)(i). Similarly, if one of the parties to the communication gives consent to the in-
terception or if the person intercepting the communication is acting under the "color of law,"
such interceptions are excluded from the prohibition. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c).
41. See In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc'ns Litig., 794 F Supp. 2d 1067 (N.D.
Cal. 2011) (denying Google's motion to dismiss); Google's Response, supra note 18.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (emphasis added).
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A. "Readily Accessible to the General Public" Exception
Subsection 2510(16) of the Act defines "readily accessible to the general
public" with respect to "a radio communication" as any communication that
is not:
(A) scrambled or encrypted;
(B) transmitted using modulation techniques whose essential parameters
have been withheld from the public with the intention of preserving the
privacy of such communication;
(C) carried on a subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio transmis-
sion;
(D) transmitted over a communication system provided by a common car-
er, unless the communication is a tone only paging system
communication; or
(E) transmitted on frequencies allocated under part 25, subpart D, E, or F of
part 74, or part 94 of the Rules of the Federal Communications Com-
mission, unless, in the case of a communication transmitted on a
frequency allocated under part 74 that is not exclusively allocated to
broadcast auxiliary services, the communication is a two-way voice
communication by radio.43
The legislative history makes clear that "[r]adio communications are
considered readily accessible to the general public unless they fit into one of
the five specified categories .... Thus, the radio communications specified
in ... subsection 2510(16) are afforded privacy protections under [the Act]
unless another exception applies." 4 Section II.A.1 below analyzes the ap-
plicability of subsection 2510(16) to Wi-Fi communications. Assuming that
subsection 2510(16) applies to Wi-Fi communications, Section II.A.2 argues
that not only are secure Wi-Fi communications clearly protected under sub-
section 2510(16)(A) but some unsecured Wi-Fi communications may also
be protected under subsection 2510(16)(E).
1. Applying Subsection 2510(16) to Wi-Fi
Communications Generally
The statutory definition of "readily accessible to the general public" in
subsection 2510(16) applies only to radio communications. However, it is
not clear whether this definition applies to communications over Wi-Fi net-
works, despite the fact that Wi-Fi networks use radio waves to transmit data.
This Section explores the arguments for and against applying subsection
2510(16) to Wi-Fi communications.
The District Court for the Northern District of California in In re Google
Inc. Street View Electronic Communications Litigation has thus far refused
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16).
44. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 14-15 (1986).
October 2012]
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to apply subsection 2510(16)'s definition to Wi-Fi communications.4 5 The
court ruled that the statutory definition specifically applies to a "radio com-
munication" and construed the term "radio communication" narrowly to
include only "traditional radio services," such as "public-directed radio
broadcast communication. 46 Since the term "radio communication" was not
defined in the Act (as compared to "electronic communication," which is
defined), the court relied on legislative history indicating that Congress
added the definition in subsection 2510(16) to alleviate radio hobbyists'
concerns and thus only to clarify that "intercepting traditional radio ser-
vices is not unlawful."47 The court also reasoned that the five exceptions
within subsection 2510(16) "are drafted for the particular technology of
traditional radio broadcast mediums and do not address any broader radio-
based communications technology."'48 To summarize, the court ruled that
even though Wi-Fi networks transmit data using radio waves, "Congress did
not intend Section 2510(16)'s narrow definition of 'readily accessible to the
general public' to apply for purposes" of subsection 251 1(2)(g)(i)'s excep-
tion to liability for intercepting all electronic communications. 49
The In re Google court's ruling that subsection 2510(16)'s definition of
"readily accessible to the general public" does not apply to Wi-Fi communica-
tions is not conclusive.5" Communications transmitted by radio, as in the case
of Wi-Fi networks, are a specific type of electronic communication, as the
statutory definition of electronic communication indicates.51 Hence, "electron-
ic communications" and "radio communications" are not mutually exclusive.
In short, the court's ruling leads to the technologically counterintuitive result
that Wi-Fi communications are not "radio communications." Further, a plain
reading of the subsection's language ("with respect to a radio communica-
tion") does not indicate that the statutory definition should only apply to one
very specific type of radio communication (i.e., "traditional radio broad-
casts").52 Section 2510's opening language ("As used in this chapter")
makes it clear that subsection 2510(16)'s definition of "readily accessible to
45. In re Google St. View, 794 E Supp. 2d 1067 (denying Google's motion to dismiss).
46. Id. at 1080.
47. Id. at 1079 (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 14,601 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
48. Id. at 1080.
49. Id. at 1081.
50. Google moved for an interlocutory appeal, and the district court granted the motion
for certification. Further, this is just one district court's conclusion; other courts might come to
a different conclusion.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006) (defining electronic communication as "any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole
or in part by a wire, radio..." (emphasis added)).
52. See Supplemental Brief for Defendant at 2, In re Google St. View, 794 F Supp. 2d
1067.
[Vol. 111:89
Limits of the Federal Wiretap Act
the general public" should apply wherever the term appears, unless the defi-
nition was explicitly confined to specific subsections.53
If subsection 2510(16)'s definition of "readily accessible to the general
public" does apply to Wi-Fi communications, it is not conclusive that only
secured Wi-Fi communications would be unprotected. Under subsection
2510(16), if a Wi-Fi network is secured with any security protocol, commu-
nications over that network would be "scrambled or encrypted" and the
"readily accessible to general public" exception to the Wiretap Act's protec-
tions would not apply to Wi-Fi communications made over that network.
54
However, this still leaves protections afforded to unsecured Wi-Fi communi-
cations unclear.
Conversely, if the definition in subsection 2510(16) does not apply, the
term "readily accessible to the general public" would be left without any
statutory definition with respect to electronic communications not related to
"traditional radio services," including Wi-Fi communications. If this is the
case, courts would have to consider more general arguments about whether
unsecured Wi-Fi communications are "readily accessible to the general pub-
lic" within the meaning of the statute.
5 6
Although the issue of applicability of subsection 2510(16) to Wi-Fi
communications remains unsettled, for the sake of completeness, the next
Section of this Note reviews the applicability of one particularly relevant
category of the "readily accessible to the general public" definition in sub-
section 2510(16)."7 Section II.A.2 argues that while some unsecured Wi-Fi
communications might fall under the "readily accessible to the general pub-
lic" exception, not all unsecured Wi-Fi communications may be excluded
from the Wiretap Act's protections.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2510. For example, in the same section of the statute the term "foreign
intelligence information" is defined in subsection 2510(19), but it is explicitly confined to a
specific portion of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(19) (confining subsection 2510(10)'s
definition of "foreign intelligence information" to subsection 2517(6) of Title 18).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (16)(A).
55. But, as discussed infra Section II.A.2, application of the current subsection
2510(16) definition to Wi-Fi communications might lead to odd results. However, unfettering
the protections from the statutory language is not necessarily preferable.
56. At the motion to dismiss stage, the In re Google court has only ruled that subsection
2510(16)'s narrow definition of "readily accessible to the general public" does not apply to
Wi-Fi communications. In re Google St. View, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1082. The court did not
make any ruling on whether unsecured Wi-Fi communications fall under subsection
2511 (2)(g)(i)'s "configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the
general public" exception. Id. at 1082-83. For how courts might interpret "readily accessible
to the general public" language in the context of unsecured Wi-Fi communications, see infra
Part III.
57. Section 2510(16)(B) ("communication[s] ... transmitted using modulation tech-
niques whose essential parameters have been withheld from the public"), section 2510(16)(C)
("communication[s] ... carried on a subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio transmis-
sion"), and section 2510(16)(D)("communication[s] ... transmitted over a communication
system provided by a common carrier") do not appear to be particularly relevant to Wi-Fi
communications. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(16)(B)-(D).
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2. Applying Subsection 2510(16) to Unsecured
Wi-Fi Communications
An alternative source of protection for secured and especially unsecured
wireless communications is subsection 2510(16)(E). The plain reading of
subsection 2510(16)(E) indicates that at least some communications over
certain Wi-Fi radio frequencies are not excluded from the Act's protections
under the "readily accessible to the general public" exception. Subsection
2510(16)(E) specifies that radio communications transmitted on frequencies
allocated under parts 25 and 94 and subparts D, E, and F of part 74 of the
FCC rules do not fall under the definition of "readily accessible to the gen-
eral public. '58 The Senate Report clarifies the purpose behind this provision:
"These communications include satellite communications, auxiliary broad-
cast services and private microwave services, each of which routinely carries
private business or personal communications.
'59
The frequencies allocated under parts of FCC rules, specified in subsec-
tion 2510(16)(E), partly overlap with the Wi-Fi operating frequencies, and
thus communications over these Wi-Fi networks might be covered within
this exception to the "readily accessible to the general public" definition. As
discussed in Part I, Wi-Fi networks divide their operating frequency bands
into channels.60 Since only certain parts of the frequency range of the
802.11b protocol are allocated under the FCC rules, only communications
over channel 11 and parts of channels 7, 8, 9, and 10 of 802.1 lb protocol are
covered for privacy protections by subsection 2510(16)(E).6" Channel 11 is
the only commonly used 802.1 lb protocol channel that might be fully pro-
tected under subsection 2510(16)(E). 62 Any electronic communications
transmitted over channel 11 of the 802.1 lb, 802.1 Ig, or 802.1 In Wi-Fi net-
works might not be considered "readily accessible to the general public" so
that interception of such communications could still violate the Act. Similar-
ly, only certain channels of the 802.11 a networks are covered by subsection
2510(16)(E) and could still be protected from interception under the Act.6 3
One criticism of this statutory interpretation is that Congress might nev-
er have intended to protect unsecured Wi-Fi communications. Although the
frequencies listed under subsection 2510(16)(E) do correspond to frequen-
cies used in Wi-Fi transmissions, on the one hand, they are mostly discussed
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(E).
59. S. REp. No. 99-541, at 15 (1986).
60. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
61. The operating frequency range 2400-2495 MHz of 802.1 lb, g, n protocols overlaps
with the frequency bands 2450-2467, 2467-2483.5 allocated under the FCC rules.
62. While channels 1, 6, and 11 are the most commonly used channels in operating
802.11 b Wi-Fi networks, channels I and 6 are outside the frequency ranges of subsection
2510(16)(E).
63. 802.1 la, which operates in the 5170-5815 MHz frequency range, uses twelve offi-
cial channels. Since only the 5091-5250 MHz frequency range is allocated by the FCC under
part 25 of its rules, only communications over the channels 36, 40, 44, and 48 of the 802.1 Ia
networks are covered by subsection 2510(16)(E). See 47 C.F.R. § 25.202 (2010).
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in the context of radio broadcasting technology.64 On the other hand, the
legislative history does not indicate that Congress intended to completely
exclude unencrypted wireless communications from the Act's protections. In
fact, the Senate Report accompanying subsection 2510(16)(E), which re-
stores the Act's protections to certain radio communications, seems to
indicate that the Senate's main concern was protecting "private business or
personal communications," even when such communications are not en-
crypted.
65
Further, in practical terms, the privacy protections afforded by subsec-
tion 2510(16)(E) are limited because the statutory language does not cover
all Wi-Fi frequencies. This leaves liability for intercepting users' private
data communicated over unsecured Wi-Fi networks contingent on the ex-
act channel that the particular Wi-Fi network was operating at the time of
interception. At best, under this statutory construction, ordinary consum-
ers' protection from interception turns not only on reading the "with
respect to a radio communication" language of subsection 2510(16) to
apply to Wi-Fi communications, but also on what frequency or channel the
user's Wi-Fi equipment was using when transmitting the private data-a
fact that users are surely unaware of in the vast majority of cases. From a
policy perspective, this result is completely arbitrary. This kind of piecemeal
protection is practically useless for users. As discussed later in Part IV, the
statute should ultimately be amended to remove the uncertainty of protections
against Wi-Fi sniffing.
66
B. The Configuration Issue
Even if unsecured Wi-Fi communications are indeed "readily accessible
to the general public," the exclusion from the Wiretap Act's protection still
does not apply unless the "configuration" requirement is also satisfied. Sub-
section 2511(2)(g)(i) specifies that it is legal to intercept "electronic
communication made through an electronic communication system that is
configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the
general public. '67 But neither the Act nor the Senate Report clarifies whether
the system needs to be configured by the user himself to fall under the
"readily accessible to the general public" exception or whether a default
configuration can deprive the user of privacy protection.
This is particularly relevant in the Wi-Fi context since many off-the-
shelf Wi-Fi routers come with default factory settings geared to operate the
network in open mode. Though manufacturers include instructions to set a
password and secure the network in accompanying product manuals, the
64. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 24,74 (2010); 47 C.F.R. § 94 (1995).
65. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 15 (1986) ("These communications include satellite com-
munications, auxiliary broadcast services and private microwave services, each of which
routinely carries private business or personal communications.").
66. See infra Part IV.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(g)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
October 20121
Michigan Law Review
onus is on the user to activate the security mechanism of the Wi-Fi router.68
If a user does not make these security adjustments, communications over
such Wi-Fi networks will continue to be unsecured. One interpretation of
subsection 2511(2)(g)(i) might provide that if the user never changed the
default settings of the Wi-Fi router, communications over such a network
might still be protected under the Act. But another interpretation might pro-
vide that if the network was configured by someone other than the user
himself, such as the manufacturer, and if the security mechanisms were not
enabled, communications over such a network would not be protected by the
Act. Yet there is no statutory text explicitly requiring the network to be con-
figured by the user himself in order for communications from the network to
be "readily accessible to the general public."
The legislative history of the "configured" language69 suggests that Con-
gress intended to protect all electronic communications unless the user has
knowingly chosen to make the communications available to the general pub-
lic. The Senate Report explained that it is lawful to intercept "public
communications" such as the closed-captioning data transmitted along with
TV programming data.70 Unlike the closed captioning of TV programming,
it is not the intent of the home Wi-Fi owner to make his private Wi-Fi com-
munications available "for the use of the general public." Similarly, when
the general public uses an unsecured Wi-Fi network at the local Starbucks or
the public library, even if the network itself is publicly accessible, users'
private communications transmitted using that public network are not meant
to be "public communications."
The Senate Report accompanying the 1986 amendments to the Act also
noted that the term "configure[d] is intended to establish an objective stand-
ard of design configuration for determining whether a system receives
privacy protection."71 This language indicates that if the electronic commu-
nications system provides public communications by design, then
communications transmitted through such a system are not protected under
68. For example, the very popular Belkin F5D7230 router ships to the user with securi-
ty mechanisms turned off. BELKIN WIRELESS G ROUTER USER MANUAL 56 (2004), available
at http://www.belkin.com/support/d/p74559-a-f5d7230-4_man_6-04.pdf ("Your Router is
equipped with WPA (Wireless Protected Access), the latest wireless security standard. It also
supports the legacy security standard, WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy). By default, wireless
security is disabled. To enable security, you must first determine which standard you want to
use." (emphasis added)) (last updated Mar. 15, 2011); see also Security, Wi-FI ALLIANCE,
http://www.wi-fi.org/security (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) ("Most Wi-Fi equipment is shipped
with security disabled to make it very easy to set up your network.").
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) ("[E]lectronic communication made through an electron-
ic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily
accessible to the general public." (emphasis added)).
70. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 18 ("Under this provision, it would not be unlawful to inter-
cept subcarrier and UBI communications that are transmitted for the use of the general public.
Such 'public' communications would include the stereo subcarrier used in FM broadcasting or
data carried on the VBI to provide closed-captioning of TV programming for the hearing-
impaired." (emphasis added)).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
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the Act. However, a home Wi-Fi network is not designed to provide a public
communications system. The purpose of such an electronic communications
system is to enable various home electronic devices to connect to the inter-
net. A few home Wi-Fi network operators may choose to enable their system
for public access, but even in those circumstances the system is configured
for public "access," not for the communications themselves to be public.
Similarly, a public Wi-Fi hotspot at the local Starbucks is configured to ena-
ble public access to the Internet, but that does not mean that private
communications transmitted using that network are intended for the general
public's consumption.
7 2
At least one district court has addressed the issue of "configuration" to
some extent. In United States v. Ahrndt, 3 the defendant operated an unse-
cured Wi-Fi network at his home and had his iTunes program74 configured
to publicly share his video library, including a collection of child pornogra-
phy. A police officer accessed the video files in the defendant's iTunes
library by using the defendant's unsecured Wi-Fi network. The district court
held that since "the wireless network and iTunes software were configured
so that the general public could access them," the police officer's access of
defendant's video files was lawful under the Wiretap Act.75 The court noted
that even though operating the open Wi-Fi network did not require any posi-
tive action by the defendant, since the default factory configuration of the
wireless router was to operate in unsecured mode, sharing an iTunes library
did require positive action by the defendant. The court decided that the act
of sharing the iTunes library on an open Wi-Fi network made such commu-
nications "readily accessible to the general public" under subsection
251 1(2)(g)(i).
In light of this holding, perhaps communications over open Wi-Fi net-
works might not be considered "readily accessible to the general public" if
the user does not take some sort of affirmative action in configuring the
wireless router to be open. But the decision to share a video library is dis-
tinguishable from the decision to use an unsecured Wi-Fi network. Factual
circumstances of individual Wi-Fi routers will undoubtedly influence court
rulings, and no court has conclusively held that the Wi-Fi network must be
specifically configured to be open by the owner of the network to fall under
the definition of "readily accessible to general public" under subsection
2511 (2)(g)(i). A colorable argument could be made that if the network own-
er himself did not configure the wireless router to operate in unsecured
mode, subsection 251 1(2)(g)(i)'s exception should not apply.
72. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
73. No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010).
74. iTunes is a software application that lets users purchase, play, and organize digital
music and video on their computers and other mobile devices. What Is iTunes?, ITuNEs,
http://www.apple.com/itunes/what-is/ (last visited May 23, 2012).




Though there is limited case law interpreting the "readily accessible to
general public" exception to liability for intercepting Wi-Fi communica-
tions, some have concluded that this exception to the Act removes all
unencrypted Wi-Fi networks from the Act's protection.7 6 Google relied on
this theory in trying to dismiss the class action suit against it. However, such
a broad conclusion need not be drawn.
As discussed in Section II.A above, the purely textual statutory inter-
pretation of "readily accessible to the general public" as defined in
subsection 2510(16) could be read to provide protection to all secured and
some unsecured Wi-Fi communications. Or, as the court in In re Google
reasoned, the statutory definition of "readily accessible to the general pub-
lic" could be read as not applying to Wi-Fi communications at all, leaving
the meaning of that term completely undefined in that setting. In either case,
a colorable argument, as laid out in Section II.B, can be made that unless the
user himself configures the Wi-Fi network to operate in unsecured mode,
subsection 2511 (2)(g)(i)'s "readily accessible to the general public" excep-
tion does not apply to Wi-Fi communications over such unsecured networks.
The legislative history of the "configured" requirement also indicates that
unless electronic communications are intended to be public communica-
tions, such communications do not lose the Act's protections.
III. INTERPRETING "READILY ACCESSIBLE
TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC"
Since the statutory definition of "readily accessible to the general pub-
lic" in subsection 2510(16) might not apply-and even if it did apply, it
might lead to bizarre results-courts might have to interpret the term "in
accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning."77 The concept, at a basic
level, might mean that the user has put the information out into the public
sphere in a way that should be understood as effectively relinquishing an
expectation of privacy. But many users of unsecured Wi-Fi networks do not
think of their private Wi-Fi communications as existing in the public sphere
and do expect a level of privacy in the data that they transmit on these net-
works. This Part examines the reasons behind these expectations and argues
that the term "readily accessible to the general public" should be interpreted
in a way that conforms to the general public's expectations of privacy and
addresses concerns about Wi-Fi sniffing.
76. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Kern, Whacking, Joyriding and War-Driving: Roaming Use
of Wi-Fi and the Law, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 138 (2004).
77. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,476 (1994).
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A. Wi-Fi Users'Expectations
A large percentage of ordinary users seem to lack an appreciation for the
risks associated with operating and using an unsecured Wi-Fi network.78
Even if operators and users of unsecured wireless networks understand that
unauthorized users might be able to gain access to their wireless network,
they are typically unaware that data transmitted over such unsecured Wi-Fi
networks can still be intercepted unless the data is somehow encrypted.7 9
This mostly stems from the fact that most users of Wi-Fi networks do not
understand how the technology works.8° Wi-Fi networks transmit data over
invisible radio waves, and since the transmitted data cannot be "sensed"
through ordinary senses, ordinary users may believe that their data is private
and secure even if it is not encrypted.
The distinction between users' expectations regarding accessing and us-
ing an unsecured Wi-Fi network and users' expectations that whatever
private data they send on these networks is still private is crucial. Users do
not shy away from "borrowing" others' unsecured Wi-Fi networks. For ex-
ample, a recent survey found that as many as 32 percent of respondents
admitted to using their neighbors' unsecured Wi-Fi networks. 81 In this case,
users know that the Wi-Fi network they are using is unsecured and hence
that others can access the same network. But at the same time, because of
the limited understanding of the underlying technology and the concomitant
security risks, users still expect that their own private communications over
these unsecured Wi-Fi networks are themselves secure. Similarly, a user
accessing the unsecured Wi-Fi network at her local Starbucks knows that
others are accessing the same network but still expects that whatever private
information she is sending to her bank over that Wi-Fi network remains pri-
vate. The widespread "seemingly innocuous use of public Wi-Fi hot spots" '82
further tends to reaffirm the sense of privacy and security.
This distinction between the public accessibility of an unsecured Wi-Fi
network and the privacy of communications transmitted over such a network
is also clear from the language of the Wiretap Act's "readily accessible to
the general public" exception. The exception exempts interception of an
electronic communication if that communication was "made through an
78. For example, a student survey, based on door-to-door interviews in three different
neighborhoods in Boca Raton, Florida, recently found that many residents were surprised to
learn of the security risks and threats to their unsecured home Wi-Fi networks. See RAFAEL
LACHOWSKI ET AL., UNSECURED RESIDENTIAL WIRELESS NETWORKS 18 (2009), available at
http://itom.fau.edu/jgoo/sp09/ISM4220/mrk.pdf. The same survey also found a negative corre-
lation between the average income of the community and the level of awareness of security
risks, and a negative correlation between the average income of the community and the num-
ber of unsecured wireless networks. Id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., id.





electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic
communication is readily accessible to the general public."83 To trigger the
exemption, it should not simply be sufficient for the "electronic system"
(i.e., the Wi-Fi network) to be accessible to the general public, which is true
in the case of an unsecured Wi-Fi network since anyone can access the net-
work without a password. Instead, the "electronic communication" itself
(i.e., the user's private data being transmitted over the radio waves) should
have to be easily accessible to the general public.
To be sure, users have some ability to protect themselves by only using
secured Wi-Fi networks. They could secure their home Wi-Fi networks
and refuse to use unsecured public Wi-Fi hotspots. Though implementing
a secured network through the use of encryption can mitigate security risks
from over-the-air sniffing, use of security technologies continues to be chal-
lenging for many ordinary users. Unfortunately, security features designed to
protect users are not enabled by default by the equipment manufacturers, con-
trary to what users might expect.84 This further adds to the false sense of
privacy and security among the general public.
85
Even if the users are aware of Wi-Fi security risks and available security
mechanisms, ordinary home users find it difficult to enable these features.8 6
In response to these difficulties, manufacturers have started offering various
products that attempt to simplify security setup by changing design features
on Wi-Fi routers.87 In fact, the Wi-Fi Alliance-a body that promotes Wi-Fi
technology and certifies products that conform to Wi-Fi industry stand-
ards-recognized consumer difficulty in enabling security features and, in
response, developed a new mechanism called Wi-Fi Protected Setup
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
84. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. A few commentators have suggested
creating civil liability against Wi-Fi router manufacturers for failure to provide necessary
security (i.e., failing to enable the security mechanism by default) that later results in exploita-
tion by hackers. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koening, The Tort of Negligent
Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553 (2005).
85. The term "general public" refers to society at large in broad terms. To be sure, the
technological awareness and comfort with technology varies widely based on socioeconomic
status, education level, et cetera. There is also a "generational gap" in technological savvy and
ability to use complex security technology. See generally Larry D. Rosen, Understanding the
Technological Generation Gap, NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST, Mar. 2004, available at
http://www.csudh.edu/psych/tnp45.htm.
86. See, e.g., Wi-Fi ALLIANCE, Wi-Fi CERTIFIEDTM FOR Wi-Fi PROTECTED SETUP:
EASING THE USER EXPERIENCE FOR HOME AND SMALL OFFICE WI-FI® NETWORKS 2
(2007), available at http://www.wi-fi.org/files/wp_18_20070108_Wi-FiProtectedSetup WP_
FINAL.pdf ("While consumers have become increasingly aware of the importance of Wi-Fi
security and have been enabling it more frequently, many networks remain unsecured, often
due to the difficulty of traditional security configuration. Recent Wi-Fi Alliance research
indicates that 44 percent of Wi-Fi users report that enabling security features on their Wi-Fi
networks is moderately to very difficult.").
87. For instance, the "SecureEasySetup" feature provided by Broadcom simply requires
a user to push a button on the wireless router and a corresponding button on the client
device. See SecureEasySetup Software, BROADCOM, http://www.broadcom.com/products/
secureeasysetup.php (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
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("WPS"), which serves "to ease setup of Wi-Fi networks and encourage
consumers to always enable security features."88 But these measures have
not had overwhelmingly positive results, and a significant number of Wi-Fi
networks continue to operate in unsecured mode.8 9
Further, most public hotspots whether free or commercial, continue to
operate in unsecured mode due to technology limitations. 90 Most free public
hotspots leave their networks "open" and do not require users to authenti-
cate before using the network. This is chiefly because the technology to set
up an authenticated Wi-Fi hotspot is cumbersome, and even when such an
authentication mechanism is set up, the data transmitted between the wire-
less router and the user's device still might not be secure. 91 Commercial
hotspot providers such as Gogo, Boingo, and T-Mobile require users to au-
thenticate (and pay) over an encrypted channel before using their networks,
but they do not encrypt the users' data transmissions and instead advise their
customers to use other encryption mechanisms.92 Even though these com-
mercial Wi-Fi hotspots do not offer security for their users' private
88. Press Release, Wi-Fi Alliance® to Ease Setup of Home Wi-Fi Networks with New
Industry-Wide Program, Wi-FI ALLIANCE (Jan. 8, 2007), http://www.wi-fi.org/news-
articles.php?f=medianews&news_id=263 ("Wi-Fi Protected Setup's simple, standardized
approaches allow typical Wi-Fi users to set up and expand their Wi-Fi networks with security
enabled, even if they do not understand the underlying technologies or processes involved.").
89. See supra notes 13, 25; see also Steve Ragan, Financial and Business Wi-Fi Easy to
Crack or Non-existent, TECH HERALD (May 14, 2009, 5:20 p.m.), http://
www.thetechherald.com/article.php/200920/3679/Financia-Wi-Fi-easy-to-crack-or-non-existent
(discussing a survey that found that 57 percent of Wi-Fi networks detected in the financial
districts of several cities were either using the weak form of security or no security at all).
90. For example, McDonald's, in announcing free Wi-Fi services at its restaurants,
stated that "WEP encryption is not yet practical for a public access network, due in part to the
absence of a standardized method for relaying encryption keys between different manufactur-
ers' equipment." Free Wi-Fi @ McDonald's, McDONALDS.COM, http://www.mcdonalds
.comlus/en/services/freewifi.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
91. Some Wi-Fi Hotspots use software applications called "Hotspot Management Sys-
tems" to authenticate users. These systems might be able to implement the WEP security
scheme to encrypt individual users' data, but WEP has proven to be ineffective in protecting
against packet sniffing by other users of the same Wi-Fi network, because all users' data is
encrypted using the same shared key. Security mechanisms such as WPA and WPA2 are able
to protect users from sniffing, but the Hotspot Management Systems are ill equipped to handle
WPA or WPA2. See, e.g., Can I Setup an Encrypted Wireless Network with Your
System?, HOTSPOT SYSTEM HELPDESK, http://www.hotspotsystem.com/deskpro/kb-
article.php?ref=1364-WLXB-3087 (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
92. See, e.g., Terms of Use, GOGO INFLIGHT INTERNET, http://www.gogoair.com/
gogo/cms/term.do#term7 (last visited Mar. 17, 2012) ("The connection through which you
purchase Gogo is an SSL-encrypted link. However, following such purchase, due to multiple
users of our inflight Wi-Fi access point, Gogo does not provide an encrypted communication
channel (Wired Equivalency Protection known as 'WEP') or (Wi-Fi Protected Access known
as 'WPA') between our in-flight Wi-Fi access point and your computer... You should be
aware, however, that data packets from un-encrypted Wi-Fi connections can be captured by
technically advanced means when they are transmitted between a user's device and the Wi-Fi
access point."); Frequently Asked Questions, BOINGO WIRELESS, http://www.boingo.coml
boingo-faq.php (last visited Mar. 17, 2012); T-Mobile HotSpot Security Statement, supra note
32.
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communications, their ubiquity and widespread use tend to create a false
sense of privacy and security. There must be some sense of security, because
so many people continue to pay for and use those networks. 93
Security mechanisms such as Virtual Private Network ("VPN") 94 and
Secure Sockets Layer ("SSL")95 technology provide a way for users of un-
secured Wi-Fi networks to encrypt their private communications irrespective
of the underlying Wi-Fi network settings, but this technology is even more
complicated and cumbersome to use for unsophisticated users. VPN tech-
nology is normally used by businesses and government agencies, 96 and it
remains beyond the reach of most ordinary users, both from technical and
financial perspectives. Further, "most major providers of web-based email
and other sensitive web-based services do not even give their users the op-
tion of using SSL, let alone turn it on by default."97 Until websites and all
other online service providers adopt SSL technology broadly and make it the
default behavior, so that even users who do not understand the security con-
cepts will be protected, reliance on the availability of SSL to secure data
transmissions over unsecured Wi-Fi networks is misplaced because this
technology does not completely protect users. 98
Despite these security limitations, for many people, using a public Wi-Fi
network at libraries, coffee shops, and other such places continues to be an
important and convenient way of connecting to the internet while away from
their homes or offices. Free public Wi-Fi networks also provide a means to
the internet for people who do not have, or cannot afford, a personal internet
93. Perhaps the general public's sense of privacy with respect to private data is unrea-
sonable when using a free unsecured Wi-Fi network at the local Starbucks. One could also
imagine a clearly visible sign at the local Starbucks claiming that private communications over
the unsecured Wi-Fi network can be intercepted. In such a case, if the users continue to expect
privacy in their data, such expectations might not be reasonable. However, when the general
public uses commercial Wi-Fi providers, they might reasonably expect that their communica-
tions are private. The fact that these providers state in their "Terms of Use" that they do not
provide encrypted communication channels does not change these expectations, particularly
because most users do not read the "Terms of Use."
94. VPN technology uses public unsecured network infrastructure to provide secure
access to private networks. Usually, VPN technology is used to provide remote offices or indi-
vidual users with secured access to their organization's network. See GARY P. SCHNEIDER,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 86 (9th ed. 2011).
95. SSL is an industry standard used by several websites to encrypt data transmitted
between a web server and a user's browser. Traditionally, websites that require authentication
or accept payment and other such sensitive information use the SSL technology to protect data
exchanged between the website and the user from eavesdroppers. See What is SSL?, SSL.coM,
http://info.ssl.com/article.aspx?id=10241 (last visited June 22, 2011).
96. See, e.g., Roger Cheng, Lost Connections, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2007, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB 119717610996418467.html.
97. Peter Eckersley, FTC to Internet Companies: Start Using SSL, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/ftc-internet-
companies-start-using-ssl.
98. Recently, the "outgoing FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour called on Web
services like Yahoo!, Facebook and Hotmail to start using HTTPS/SSL encryption" and "put
these companies on-notice." Id.
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connection. Given that we are becoming an increasingly mobile society reli-
ant on internet connectivity, users might continue to use public Wi-Fi
networks for private communications even if we were to make all Wi-Fi
users aware of the security risks.99
B. The Fourth Amendment and "Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy"
An approach to interpreting "readily accessible to the general public"
that takes into account users' expectations, their understanding of technolo-
gy, and the current state of security technology is consistent with notions of
"reasonable expectations of privacy" under the Fourth Amendment. The
Fourth Amendment doctrine only applies to government searches, and thus
has no bearing as a formal matter on the Wiretap Act's statutory protections
against interception of electronic communications."° Nonetheless, this doc-
trine can help clarify what it means for something to be configured to be
readily accessible to the general public. The "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" test can also verify whether the notions advanced above about users'
privacy expectations are consistent with notions of reasonableness regarding
expectations of privacy in other areas of law.' If users have a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in unsecured private Wi-Fi communications, the
Fourth Amendment would prevent the police from intercepting such com-
munications without a warrant. 10 2 If the Constitution and our intuitions say
that the police cannot and should not be able to intercept unsecured private
Wi-Fi communications without a warrant, this would be consistent with
finding that a private party like Google is also prohibited from intercepting
such communications. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens "against un-
reasonable searches and seizures" in order to "guard against the arbitrary use
of Government power to maintain surveillance over citizens."'0 3 The often
cited "reasonable expectations of privacy" test, first formulated in Katz v.
United States,/4 provides that "[iln order to benefit from Fourth Amendment
99. Rik Fairlie, Coffee, TV or Wi-Fi?, N.Y. TIMES GADGETWiSE (Oct. 8, 2010, 4:10
PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com2010/10/08/coffee-tv-or-wi-fi/ (discussing survey
results showing "a desire for constant connectivity" through Wi-Fi).
100. Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[I]nterception (as
defined by the statute) of wire communications is forbidden regardless of the speaker's expec-
tation of privacy."); United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 349 (10th Cir. 1974) (noting lack of
"reasonable expectation of privacy" requirement with regard to intercepted wire communica-
tions).
101. To this end, this Note does not exhaustively analyze Fourth Amendment case law.
102. This assumes that society might be willing to compromise and lose some privacy
interests in exchange for police protections when a police search with a warrant is allowed.
However, this compromise argument is weaker when private parties invade users' privacy
interests.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violat-
ed."); S. REP. No. 99-541, at 12 (1986).
104. 389 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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protections, an individual must demonstrate a subjective expectation that his
activities would be private, and ... that his expectation was one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable."' 5
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court applied the "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" test to modem technology, holding that the use of a
thermal imaging device from a public vantage point to monitor the radiation
of heat from a person's home was a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.0 6 Similar to thermal imaging, Wi-Fi sniffing can be
thought of as monitoring radio waves emanating from inside the home. The
Kyllo Court held that to use "technology ... not in general public use" to
detect information from inside the home that could not otherwise be ob-
tained except by actually entering the home constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search. 107 The Court's reference to technology that is not in
"general public use" is illustrative in its application of the objective prong of
the Katz test-an expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasona-
ble.108 Thus, if the technology used to monitor the activities inside a person's
home is not generally accessible to the general public, that person may
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in those activities.'°9
Kyllo's reasoning indicates that the current understanding of users' ex-
pectations that unsecured private Wi-Fi communications are immune from
sniffing is reasonable. 110 Though Wi-Fi packet-sniffing tools are available on
105. United States v. Young, 573 F3d 711, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations
omitted).
106. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
107. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
108. Id. at 33. The Court gave other examples of technologies that it considered not to be
in general public use: "But just as a thermal imager captures only heat emanating from a
house, so also a powerful directional microphone picks up only sound emanating from a house
and a satellite capable of scanning from many miles away would pick up only visible light
emanating from a house." Id. at 35.
In a recent case, United States v. Jones, though the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
apply the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in the context of modem technology, it
avoided the issue by holding on narrower grounds that the police's act of physically attaching
a tracking device to a car constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). However, the opinion in no way changed the application of the "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" doctrine in electronic surveillance cases not involving
physical trespass, as is commonly the case with Wi-Fi sniffing. Id. at 947 ("[T]he Katz reason-
able-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test."); id. at 954 ("It may be that achieving the same result through electronic
means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the
present case does not require us to answer that question."); id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) ("Resolution of these difficult questions in this case is unnecessary, however, because the
Government's physical intrusion on Jones' Jeep supplies a narrower basis for decision.").
109. Id. at 34; Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) ("It may well
be ... that surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equip-
ment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant." (emphasis added)).
110. Users probably do not have reasonable expectations of privacy in the addressing
information contained in data packets transmitted over Wi-Fi networks. See Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) ("[E]ven if petitioner did harbor some subjective
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the internet for free, the technical expertise necessary to use these tools is
anything but common knowledge among the general public."' To illustrate,
courts refused to recognize an expectation of privacy in cordless phone con-
versations as reasonable since, in the early stages of cordless phone
technology, conversations "could be intercepted easily with readily availa-
ble technology, such as an AM radio.""' 2 For the same reason, the Wiretap
Act initially did not protect cordless phone conversations." 3 However, later
when cordless phone technology improved to make it more difficult to inter-
cept these communications, Congress amended the Wiretap Act to extend
protection to cordless phone conversations." 4 In the case of unsecured Wi-Fi
communications, specialized sniffing tools and expertise are needed for
interception but, unlike AM radios, are not commonly available. Thus, the
current state of Wi-Fi sniffing technology may support Kyllo's reasoning
and the general public's reasonable expectations in unsecured Wi-Fi com-
munications." 5 Further, the fact that most operators of home Wi-Fi
networks never intentionally configure their networks to operate in unse-
cured mode (it is the manufacturer's default configuration) indicates that
these users have not taken any steps to indicate that they have relinquished
any reasonable expectations of privacy.
Reasonable expectations of privacy in unsecured Wi-Fi communica-
tions need not be limited to home Wi-Fi networks; expectations in private
expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not
'one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.'" (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967))). However, users may still have "reasonable expectations of privacy" in
the private information contained in data packets (i.e., payload data) transmitted over Wi-Fi
networks.
111. Arguably, sniffing technology may get simpler as technology progresses. Once this
technology becomes widely accessible to the common public, then perhaps the private Wi-Fi
communications themselves will become more easily accessible to the general public. For
example, a recently developed sniffing tool, "Firesheep," an extension available for the popu-
lar Firefox web browser, makes sniffing private data on open Wi-Fi networks very easy.
Evelyn Rusli, Firesheep in Wolves' Clothing: Extension Lets You Hack into Twitter, Facebook
Accounts Easily, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/10/24/firesheep-
in-wolves-clothing-app-lets-you-hack-into-twitter-facebook-accounts-easily.
112. Price v. Turner, 260 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting S.
REP. No. 99-541, at 12 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Based on the "open fields" doctrine of Oliver v. United States, one may argue that
once the Wi-Fi signals have escaped into the "open fields" (i.e., outside of the home and the
immediately surrounding area called "curtilage"), the user cannot have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the information contained in those signals. 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
However, the Oliver Court did not abandon the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test
and held only that because open fields are accessible to the public and police in ways that a
home or commercial structure would not be, and because fences or "No Trespassing" signs do
not effectively bar the public from viewing open fields, an asserted expectation of privacy in
open fields is not one that society recognizes as reasonable. Id. at 179. In the case of Wi-Fi
communications transmitted over invisible radio waves-waves that might have escaped the




communications transmitted using an unsecured Wi-Fi network available at
a public place, such as Starbucks, may also be reasonable. Kyllo focused on
expectations of privacy for information emanating from within a home, and
"home" has a special place in our society in terms of privacy expectations."
16
However, Fourth Amendment case law has never necessarily limited reason-
able privacy expectations to the home.1 7 In fact, Katz-the progenitor of the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test-held that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people ... not simply 'areas.' "118 Katz held that a person using a
public telephone booth may rely on Fourth Amendment protections, be-
cause, regardless of the location, a private communication is protected as
long as it is made with a "reasonable expectation of privacy."' 19 Because of
the need for specialized technology to intercept unsecured private Wi-Fi
communications, the general public's expectations of privacy in personal
communications made using a Starbucks Wi-Fi network are not necessarily
diminished, 2 ° even though the network is public.' 2 '
As discussed in Section II.B, the district court in United States v. Ahrndt
applied the Katz test to rule that evidence of child pornography found on the
defendant's computer through his open Wi-Fi network and shared iTunes
library could be used against him in court, even absent a warrant. 2 2 The
court concluded that "society recognizes a lower expectation of privacy in
116. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) ("In the home, our cases
show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying govern-
ment eyes.").
117. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 248-49 (1986) (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
311-13 (1978)) ("[O]ur cases holding that Fourth Amendment protections extend to business
property have expressly relied on our society's historical understanding that owners of such
property have a legitimate interest in being free from unreasonable governmental inspec-
tion.").
118. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
119. See id. at 352; Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 247 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("The reasonable expectation of privacy standard was designed to ensure that
the Fourth Amendment continues to protect privacy in an era when official surveillance can be
accomplished without any physical penetration of or proximity to the area under inspection.").
120. In United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court held that the police's use of beeper
technology to monitor the presence of a driver's automobile does not violate Fourth Amend-
ment, since expectations of privacy do not extend to visual surveillance from public places.
460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). More specifically, the Court found that increased efficiency of po-
lice surveillance using new technology is not unconstitutional. See id. at 284. However, in the
case of sniffing Wi-Fi networks at public places, the technology is not merely increasing sur-
veillance efficiency; without the sniffing technology, surveillance would not be possible in the
first place.
121. When people have a conversation at Starbucks, they might understand that any
expectation of privacy in the contents of their conversation is minimal. Similarly, they might
understand that others might look over a laptop user's shoulder, so that privacy expectations in
the information displayed on the user's computer screen might also be diminished. But the
general public using the unsecured Starbucks Wi-Fi network may not understand the packet-
sniffing technology enough to reasonably expect diminished privacy in the information they
are transmitting over the Wi-Fi network.
122. See No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010).
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information broadcast via an unsecured wireless network router" because
"accidental unauthorized use of other people's wireless networks is a fair-
ly common occurrence" and that "[p]urposeful unauthorized use is
perhaps equally ubiquitous."'123 However, the court seems to have ignored
the distinction between society's expectations regarding accessing and
using an unsecured Wi-Fi network and users' expectations that the private
data they send on these networks is still private. For example, a user posting
comments on a publicly accessible blog using a secured or unsecured net-
work has no reasonable privacy expectation in the comments once they are
posted on the public forum,' 24 but this is not equivalent to the user's privacy
expectations in those same comments while they are transmitted over the
network.
In sum, users expect that their private data communications over Wi-Fi
networks, including communications over unsecured Wi-Fi networks, remain
private. These expectations mostly stem from users' limited understanding of
the underlying Wi-Fi technology and the corresponding security risks, and
more importantly, from the fact that private data cannot be intercepted with-
out specialized tools and knowledge. 125 Though the Fourth Amendment
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test is not a requirement of the Wiretap
Act, the analysis verifies that users' privacy expectations in unsecured Wi-Fi
communications are consistent with notions of reasonable expectations of
privacy in other areas of law. Moreover, in enacting the Wiretap Act, Con-
gress was "[u]nsure whether the flexible approach to determining the extent
of Fourth Amendment protections as announced in Katz ... would extend to
electronic communications" and intended to create "a baseline level of pro-
tection" for electronic communications. 126  Even though the Fourth
Amendment doctrine is informative, it does not suggest limits to the Wire-
tap Act's protections.12 1 In the absence of clear statutory guidance on the
123. Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *4-5.
124. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Users would logically
lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in the materials intended for publication or public
posting. They would lose a legitimate expectation of privacy in an e-mail that had already
reached its recipient." (citation omitted)).
125. It is important to note that society's privacy expectations may change with time and
technological progress. In a remarkably forward looking opinion, Justice Alito recently wor-
ried about technology and privacy intrusions:
But technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead
to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce signifi-
cant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased convenience or
security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.
And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology
entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
126. Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored
Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 349 (2009).
127. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional




meaning of "readily accessible to the general public" term, the term
should be interpreted in a manner that accords with the expectations of
general Wi-Fi users while addressing the concerns and dangers of Wi-Fi
sniffing.
IV. NEED FOR AMENDING THE WIRETAP ACT
The statutory interpretation of Wiretap Act provisions advanced in Part
II leaves protections for unsecured Wi-Fi communications too unsystematic
and uncertain. Though the interpretation of the "readily accessible to the
general public" exception advanced in Part III might address concerns about
users' expectations of privacy, an amendment to the Wiretap Act would re-
flect these concerns more explicitly and remove any unpredictability in
protecting users' expectations. 128 Given that the Act is the predominant law
protecting the privacy of electronic communications, the statute should ex-
pressly address concerns about Wi-Fi sniffing. This Part advocates
amending the statute to explicitly protect all Wi-Fi communications, wheth-
er secured or unsecured, from intentional interception.
While the long-term solution to protecting data privacy over Wi-Fi net-
works might lie in educating users and addressing technology limitations,
the Wiretap Act still has an important role to play in protecting users in the
interim. In addition, even after users have been educated, more sophisti-
cated sniffing technology might be developed to evade privacy protections.
Amending the Act to clearly protect all Wi-Fi communications can bridge
the gap between users' hypothetical ability to protect themselves and the
practical realities of doing do, while also anticipating more sophisticated
sniffing technologies. 9 Wi-Fi technology plays a very important role in
society, and the social and private costs of data and identity theft resulting
from Wi-Fi sniffing are too high for the law to ignore shortcomings in secu-
rity technology and in users' ability to protect themselves.'30
Removing the uncertainty in legal protections against Wi-Fi sniffing also
has other benefits. Given the current pace of Wi-Fi adoption, it may seem
that no additional incentives are necessary to encourage adoption of wireless
technologies. However, a robust Wiretap Act protecting users from unwar-
ranted and intentional packet sniffers could boost the adoption of new and
128. This Note assumes that the nature of the right to privacy in electronic communica-
tions tracks some notion of "reasonable expectation of privacy," at least to the extent that the
United States Constitution protects such a right. It is beyond the scope of this Note whether
there is any fundamental right to privacy stemming from various Bill of Rights amendments
that does not depend on whether people reasonably expect their information to be private.
129. The Wiretap Act could easily be amended by clarifying the applicability of subsec-
tion 2510(16)'s "readily accessible to the general public" definition and explicitly removing
unsecured Wi-Fi communications from the definition. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (2006).
130. Some members of the government acknowledge the need to expand and enhance
federal and state laws to protect people from data interception. See, e.g., Scott Morrison, Con-
necticut to Lead Multistate Probe of Google, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2010, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704895204575320802269077146.html (Connecti-
cut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal acknowledging that there is such a need).
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upcoming wireless technologies. 3 ' For example, several cities and municipal-
ities have been operating or attempting to operate municipal Wi-Fi networks
with the goal of making wireless access to the internet available citywide.
132
While addressing security concerns is vital to the success of these technolo-
gies, clear legal protections against unauthorized data interceptions could
likewise encourage the development of improvements to these technologies.
At the same time, it is important to recognize legitimate uses of Wi-Fi
sniffing and not to overregulate. Network administrators and security re-
searchers use packet sniffers to find troublesome computers that use too
much bandwidth, have the wrong network settings, or are virus infected.'33
System administrators also sniff their own networks to detect hacking at-
tempts or inappropriate traffic on their networks.'34 This genuine need for
sniffing can be addressed by carving out clear exemptions from liability for
such activities. The Act already has such an exemption for troubleshooting
purposes: it is not unlawful "to intercept any wire or electronic communica-
tion the transmission of which is causing harmful interference to any
lawfully operating station or consumer electronic equipment, to the extent
necessary to identify the source of such interference."'' 35 Current law also
includes a consent provision, where if "one of the parties to the communica-
tion has given prior consent to such interception," intercepting electronic
communications is not a violation of the Act, "unless such communication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State."'1
36
Further, the existing Act has a strong "intent" requirement, so that any acci-
dental, unintended interception of Wi-Fi communications does not result in
liability. Thus, privacy protections for unsecured Wi-Fi communications can
be extended through the Act without compromising legitimate uses of pack-
et sniffing in research and network administration.
We must also be cognizant of the collateral effects of any policy extend-
ing protections to unencrypted Wi-Fi communications. One commentator
has noted the following:
131. Referring to a gap in federal statutory standards for protecting the privacy of com-
munications transmitted by new forms of technology, a similar concern was expressed by the
Senate in its report accompanying the 1986 amendments to the Wiretap Act:
This gap results in legal uncertainty. It may unnecessarily discourage potential customers
from using innovative communications systems. It probably encourages unauthorized us-
ers to obtain access to communications to which they are not a party. It may discourage
American businesses from developing new innovative forms of telecommunications and
computer technology.
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
132. Tracy V. Wilson, How Municipal WiFi Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://computer
.howstuffworks.com/municipal-wifi.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
133. See, e.g., Karen J. Barman, Sniff Out Trouble, PCMAG.COM (May 22, 2001),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,27054,00.asp.
134. Id.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(g)(iv) (2006).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
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[A] statute that makes it a crime to obtain information only when it is en-
crypted will likely prompt victims to encrypt their information and may
encourage manufacturers to change the default settings on wireless access
products to ensure encryption. A statute with no encryption prerequisite
would unlikely have these collateral incentive effects.' 37
But even if the law affords protections to unencrypted communications,
users will still want to prevent their data privacy from being violated in the
first place, instead of relying on the law's post-hoc remedies for such viola-
tions. The general public is most likely unaware of the Act's protections.
Therefore, it is not credible to expect that users will be completely discour-
aged from encrypting their Wi-Fi communications because of the statutory
language.
It could also be argued that extending protections to unsecured Wi-Fi
communications will unnecessarily expand the reach of federal power, par-
ticularly when users can protect themselves by enabling the security features
on their personal Wi-Fi networks or by avoiding any unsecured public Wi-Fi
networks. While users can protect themselves to some extent by various
technical means, legal protections can bridge the gap in protecting users'
privacy until limitations in technology and consumer awareness can be
overcome. In ten to twenty years, users may become so educated about pri-
vacy risks, or sniffing technology may become so pervasive, that users will
not have any expectations of privacy in unsecured private Wi-Fi communi-
cations. The security technology might also make significant advances in
simpifying the securing of home Wi-Fi and public Wi-Fi networks at places
such as Starbucks.
If federal overreach is a concern, a sunset provision could be part of any
amendment to the Wiretap Act. Congress could require the FCC or a similar
regulatory body with relevant technical expertise to submit periodic com-
prehensive reports on the state of Wi-Fi technology and the need for
continued statutory privacy protections for unencrypted Wi-Fi communica-
tions. The sunset provision could mandate that any provision extending the
privacy protections to unencrypted Wi-Fi communications would expire
after a specific time period unless Congress finds a continued need for such
a provision.
CONCLUSION
If a court finds that Google intentionally intercepted users' private data
when its Street View cars scoured the airwaves for Wi-Fi networks, should
the court hold Google liable under the current Federal Wiretap Act? The
answer remains unclear. The statutory language of the Act indicates that at
least a subset of Wi-Fi communications may be protected from intentional
interception, even if Congress might not have specifically intended to cover
those types of communications when it amended the Act in 1986. Under a
different interpretation, the statutory definition of the term "readily accessi-
137. Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Voyeuristic Hacker, 11 J. INTERNET L. 1, 15 (2007).
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ble to the general public" might not apply at all. In that case, whether unse-
cured Wi-Fi communications are excluded from the statutory protections
against intentional interception remains uncertain.
Regardless of the result, the high profile nature of In re Google has
raised important questions regarding Wi-Fi sniffing and electronic privacy
law. In re Google highlights the gaps in consumer understanding of network
technology and security risks, and the shortcomings of current security
technology. But electronic privacy laws have not adequately responded to
this gap. Congress should clarify the existing electronic privacy law, which
has not been substantively updated since its passage in 1986, to reflect the
widespread use of new technologies and extend uniform protections to all
Wi-Fi communications.
118 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 111:89
